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SECTION 14(e) OF THE WILLIAMS ACT: CAN
THERE BE MANIPULATION WITH FULL
DISCLOSURE OR WAS THE MOBIL COURT
RUNNING ON EMPTY?
Section 14(e) of the Williams Act' was created to insure the
shareholder of an informed choice in a tender offer situation.2 The
statutory language, however, includes the term "manipulative acts or
practices" 3 without defining it. In fact, the entire Securities Exchange Act 4 fails to provide a definition for the term "manipulative
acts or practices." 5 The Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Industries v.
Green,6 viewed "manipulative act" in the context of section 10(b)7 as
a term of art when applied to the securities field.8 Santa Fe has been
interpreted as standing for the proposition that either nondisclosure
or material misrepresentation is a necessary element of manipulative
acts. 9 The Sixth Circuit, however, in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982). The Williams Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) to
(e), 78n(d) to (f) (1982).
2. Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1967) (statement of Manuel Cohen, Chairman, SEC).
3. Section 14(e) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a material fact
or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection
with any tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation.
The Commission shall, for the purposes of this subsection, by rules and regulations
define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts and practices
as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
4. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
5. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981).
6. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982); see infra note
88 and accompanying text.
8. 430 U.S. at 476. "The term refers generally to practices . . . that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity." Id.
9. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 287 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10b-5 After
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. RaV. 1874, 1879 (1978).
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Co.10 found that non-disclosure is not necessary," but failed to provide guidelines for courts to use in subsequent determinations.
This note, after briefly discussing the mechanics of tender offers
and the thrust of the Williams Act, focuses on the Santa Fe and
Mobil decisions in order to explore these courts' approaches toward
defining "manipulative acts." It then posits that the Mobil court's
approach follows more closely the intent of the Williams Act, with
support for this position found in the reaction of other courts to the
Mobil court's analysis. 12 This note concludes that certain resistance
tactics on the part of incumbent management are equivalent to manipulative acts"' because they deny the shareholders the opportunity
to exercise an informed choice, and that these affirmative acts, which
by design, deprive shareholders of their option, are violative of the
Williams Act.
TENDER OFFERS

Tender Offers and Management Control
The tender offer is but one of four major avenues to a change in
the control of a corporation. 4 A tender offer is made where an
outside entity (the "offeror") decides that the acquisition of another
entity (the "target company") is of value and pursues the acquisition
by offering a premium to the shareholders of the target company in
return for the tendering of their shares.15 Often, as a result of a suc10. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).

11.

Id. at 376.

12. See infra notes 110-62; see also Weiss, Defensive Responses to Tender Offers and
the Williams Act's ProhibitionAgainst Manipulation,35 VAND. L. REv. 1087 (1982).
13. See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
14. See Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive
Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819, 842 (1981).
15. The Williams Act itself does not define the term tender offer. The Securities Ex-

change Commission has offered the following definition:
Under the first tier, proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(1)(i), the term "tender offer" con-

sists of four elements: (I) one or more offers to purchase or solicitations of offers to
sell securities of a single class; (2) during any 45-day period; (3) directed to more
than 10 persons; and (4) seeking the acquisition of more than 5% of the class of
securities.
The second tier of the definition of tender offer is set forth in proposed Rule 14dl(b)(1)(ii) .

. .

. [O]ne or more offers to purchase, or solicitations of offers to sell,

securities of a single class would be a tender offer if three conditions are present.
First, the offers to purchase or the solicitation of offers to sell must be disseminated
in a widespread manner. . . . Second, the price offered must represent a premium
in excess of the greater of 5%of or $2 above the current market price of the securi-
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cessful tender offer, the incumbent management of the target company is replaced."6
The other three avenues to change in corporate control are
mergers, sales of a substantial portion of the corporation's assets,
and proxy fights.17 Management plays a critical role in mergers and
sales of substantial assets. Although both usually require shareholder
approval,1 8 shareholders cannot even consider a proposal for a
merger or sale of assets, unless the management first approves it.1 9
Management, then, can effectively deprive the shareholders of any
opportunity for a merger or sale of assets should it so desire. 0
Although proxy fights do not require the cooperation of management, they are generally difficult to wage, offer little possibility of
reimbursement should the challenge fail, and are prohibitively expensive.2 1 Furthermore, incumbent management has the use of corporate resources to resist the fight of the challenger who is using his
own funds. 2 Where incumbent management resists the takeover of
control, the tender offer thus remains the most feasible avenue to the
change of corporate control. 23
The role of management in negotiations is extremely important.
The shareholders are an unorganized body of individuals, and, as
such, rely upon the management team of the corporation to represent their interests in negotiations. The ability of the shareholders
to act as a powerful, united entity through the management is actualized and given strength by the discretion alloted to the management. 24 There must also, however, be a means of checking manageties being sought. The third condition . . . is that the offers do not provide for a
meaningful opportunity to negotiate the price and terms.
SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16,385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. REP.
(CCH) 82,374, at 82,603-05 (Dec. 19, 1979) (footnotes omitted). For a discussion on the
definition of "tender offer," see Mather, The Elusive Definition of a Tender Offer, 7 J. CORP.
L. 503 (1982).
16. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAw. 1733 (1981); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have A Right To Resist Tender Offers, 3 Cop. L. Rav. 107 (1980).
17. Gilson, supra note 14, at 843.
18. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251 (merger), 271 (sale of assets) (1975 &
Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 902 (merger), 909 (sale of assets) (McKinney 1963 &
Supp. 1980).
19. Gilson, supra note 14, at 843.

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 842-45.
Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 16, at 111.
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ment's inclination to make decisions based on the motive of selfperpetuation. At the same time management is given the discretion
it needs to exercise its corporate functions, a provision must be made
for a "safety valve" 2 --a viable means of replacing incumbent management should the shareholders so desire. This "safety valve" is
crucial both to the preservation of management's decision making
role in mergers and sales of assets, and to the limitation of management's role in tender offer situations.28
Typically, management is in an advantageous position to assess
the effect of a proposed tender offer on the target company. The
management may feel that a higher price may be obtainable, or that
a corporation more compatible with the target's purposes and goals
may be found. This has led many writers2 to espouse the position
that management should be allowed to respond to a tender offer with
a variety of maneuvers, either facilitating or interfering with the proposed offer. Granting management unlimited discretion, however,
does not make any allowance for incumbent management's self-interest and the effect that this motivation may have-consciously or
unconsciously-on their judgment. Most often a successful tender offer will result in the incumbent managers being replaced by a new
management team selected by the offeror. In the eyes of incumbent
management, the specter of losing their jobs may very well outweigh
the possible benefits to the corporation when they balance the projected results of a tender offer. This conflict of interest is inherent in
a tender offer situation and it would be unwise to allow full discretion and a free hand on the part of incumbent management. 8
If the target management decides that the tender offer is not in
the best interest of the corporation (or of themselves in terms of re25.

"Safety valve" refers to the ability of the acquiring company (or any other com-

pany) to go beyond stalled negotiations in a merger situation. Since management has relatively
unfettered discretion in the negotiation process, it may effectively block the acquisition. Man-

agement's motivation may be business-oriented or self-oriented. Either way, the acquiring
company may then propose a tender offer. With a "safety valve," the shareholders of the
target company are thereby provided the opportunity to decide for themselves on an appropriate course of action. If management can forestall a tender offer, no such "safety valve" then
exists. See id. at 113; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 1745-47.
26. Gilson, supra note 14, at 849-50.
27. E.g., Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 16, at 107-16; Lipton, Takeover Bids in
the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom; An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981).
28. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1161, 1175, 1198 (1981); Herzel, Schmidt &
Davis, supra note 16, at 112-13.
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taining corporate control), it may employ various defensive maneuvers to avoid the takeover. 9 It may search for a "white
knight"--another corporation which is more amenable to the management and would be willing to either merge with it- or make a
competing tender offer. 30 Alternatively, the target management may
acquire an asset that will cause antitrust complications for the offeror should the tender offer be successful."' In addition, it may
divest the corporation of certain assets attractive to the offeror, or
enter into agreements with other corporations giving them options to
acquire those assets should the tender offer be successful.32 All of
these maneuvers, if successful, not only result in the elimination of
competition in the bidding, but effectively eliminate the shareholders' ability to decide whether or not to tender their shares to any
bidder.
Allowing target management to engage in this type of action
could enervate the effectiveness of tender offers as a control on management's efficiency. 38 Recognition of the importance of management's evaluation of the impending takeover does not inexorably lead
one to grant a position of free-rein to management in acting on the
tender offer. There must be a role for management that benefits the
shareholder while not depriving the shareholder of the ultimate
power of decision.
The Williams Act
The Williams Act" was enacted in 1968 in an effort to bring
tender offers into a position in which neither the offeror nor the target company had an advantage, and in which the target company's
shareholders were able to make a free and informed choice.3 5 Before
29. For a general overview of defensive tactics to tender offers, see E. ARANow & H.
EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 219-76 (1973); A. FLEISCHER, JR.,
TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 113-55 (1981).
30. E.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson

Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.
1981); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. I1. 1982).

31.

E.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454

U.S. 1092 (1981); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
32. E.g., Mobil Corp., v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Whittaker
Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. I1. 1982).
33. The role of the tender offer as the monitor of management's efficiency is discussed
fully in Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 1734-39 and Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 28, at 1169-74.
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) to (e), 78n(d) to (f) (1982).
35. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2636-37 (1982); Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187-88 (3d
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the passage of the Williams Act, offerors were able to use non-disclosure, time pressure, and other techniques to force shareholders
into rushed, panic-stricken decisions."6 By including provisions which
required full disclosure3 7 and time allotments,3 8 the shareholder was
given the protection needed to allow for an informed, unfettered
choice. The tender offeror must file a statement with the Securities
Exchange Commission disclosing such information as its background
and identity; 9 the source and amount of funds to be used to pay for
the tendered shares;40 any plans or proposals to make major changes
in the target company's corporate structure; 41 and the existence of
arrangements with any person with respect to any securities of the
issuer.42
According to the Williams Act, any person who tendered shares
in response to the tender offer can withdraw them any time within
seven days of the commencement of the offer. 43 The offeror must
purchase, on a pro rata basis, all shares tendered within ten days of
the offer if more shares were tendered than the bid requested." If at
any time during the tender offer, the offeror increases the bid, all
tendering shareholders will receive the increases regardless of
whether they tendered their shares before or after the increase.45
Prospective tendering shareholders, therefore, can fully deliberate
prior to their decision to tender (or withdraw the tender of) their
shares with the knowledge that they will share, on a pro rata basis,
the ultimate price offered and that they cannot be closed out within
the specified time frame. The disclosure of information, as well as
the provision for sufficient time in which to decide, allows for an
informed choice for all shareholders, not a pressured rush on a firstcome, first-served basis.
Cir. 1980).
36. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 1162.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).

38. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) to (7) (1982).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(A) (1982).
40. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (1982).
41.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (1982).

42. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(I)(E) (1982).
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1982). This statute gives the Securities Exchange Commission authority to regulate the time in which the shareholder may tender; the Securities Exchange Commission extended it to fifteen business days. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1982).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). The Securities Exchange Commission amended Rule
14d-8, 47 Fed. Reg. 57,679 (1982) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8) (proposed Dec.
28, 1982), to require pro rata purchase of all shares tendered during the period the offer
remains open.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1982).
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At the same time, however, the target company's management
is given the opportunity to take advantage of the new timing and
disclosure requirements by engaging in defensive tactics designed to
defeat the tender offer regardless of the desires of the shareholders.46
Some commentators argue, for example, that extending the
proration period will give the target company more time to undertake defensive measures, thereby defeating offers which would have
been in the best interests of their shareholders or deterring potential offerors from making an offer. Similarly, it is asserted that to
the extent the change would decrease the likelihood of arbitrageurs
securing very favorable positions in the initial proration pool, it
would reduce the price at which they are willing to purchase
shares, thereby depriving shareholders of a lucrative
alternative
7
method of disposing of their shares during an offer.'
This development was in direct opposition to the avowed legislative
purpose, which was to remain neutral and allow the shareholder free
choice.'8 It was, however, inevitable as the prohibitions involved are
somewhat vague. There is, for example, a prohibition against "manipulation. 49 Unfortunately, neither the Williams Act, nor the Securities Exchange Act, defines manipulation.50
The scope of the term "manipulation" has been the gravamen of
many cases. 51 It is at the heart of differing interpretations of section
10(b)5 2 as well as of section 14(e).53 The leading case involving the
manipulation element of section 10(b) is Santa Fe Industries v.
Green,5 where the Supreme Court seems to require non-disclosure
46. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 28, at 1163.
47. Grienenberger & Walter, Recent Developments in Takebver Techniques & Defenses: The Front-End Loaded Offer & The Pac-Man Defense, 11 SEC '83 161, 169 n.19
(1982) (discussing the amendment to rule 14d-8). For a discussion of the role of arbitrageurs,
see Phalon, Tipping the Takeover Balance of Power, 16 MERG. & AcQ. 52 (1982).
48. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S. Ct. 2629, 2637 (1982); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
50. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 1981).
51. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411
F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
52. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). See generally
5b JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 §§ 138-141 (1982).
53. Williams Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982); see Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
54. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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as an element of a finding of manipulation. 5 In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,56 however, the Sixth Circuit specifically finds nondisclosure as not essential to a determination of manipulation under
section 14(e).5 7 While the language used in section 10(b) is virtually
identical to the language used in section 14(e) with respect to manipulation,58 the thrust of the provisions may not be the same due to
the unique position of the shareholder with regard to a tender offer.59
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF MANIPULATIVE ACTS

Santa Fe Industries v. Green

In Santa Fe Industries v. Green,60 a Delaware corporation,
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. ("Sante Fe") owned ninety-five per cent of
Kirby Lumber.61 According to Delaware Corporation Law section
25 3,62 the "short form merger" statute,63 if a parent company owns
55. Id. at 474 & n.14.
56. 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 376-77.
They are
58. "The two provisions are coextensive in their antifraud prohibitions ....
therefore construed in par! materia by the courts. . . . Both provisions are manifestations of
the 'philosophy of full disclosure' embodied in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
(quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977)); see also Mobil, 669 F.2d at
363.
59. See Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y.),
rev'd, No. 83-7639 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 1983), petitionfor cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S.
Dec. 21, 1983) (No. 83-1023):
[T]he proposition that Section 14(e) and Section 10(b) are 'construed in pari
materia by the courts' . . . is limited. . . . [T]he courts have also recognized that
Section 14(e) contains the special, qualifying language 'in connection with any
tender offer,' which makes it a provision that extends to concerns very different from
those of Section 10(b).
Id. at 1551 (citations omitted); see also 114 CONG. REc. H21484 (daily ed. July 15, 1968)
(statement of Rep. Moss) ("[T]he enactment of [§ 14(e)] does not represent approval [or
disapproval] of any suggested rules under § 10(b). That section stands on its own feet.").
60. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
61. Id. at 465.
62. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(a) (1982).
63. A merger is the combination of two or more corporations with the surviving corporation "possessing all the rights, privileges, powers . . . and being subject to all the restrictions,
... DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
disabilities and duties of each such corporations so merged.
259(a) (1982). In a merger between two or more independent corporations, a majority of each
corporation's shareholders must approve the merger. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(c),
252(c) (1982). A parent-subsidiary corporate relationship, however, allows for an abbreviated
procedure. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1982); see A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 220 (1976):
If the parent corporation holds 90 percent of the voting shares of a subsidiary
which is to be merged into the parent, the statutes brush away the formality of
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at least ninety per cent of the stock of the subsidiary, and if the
parent's board of directors approves, it can merge and "cash out" to
minority shareholders. Section 253 does not require the consent of,
or advance notice to, minority shareholders, but does require that
notice be given within ten days of the merger." Shareholders dissatisfied with the payment may petition the Delaware Court of Chancery in an appropriate proceeding for fair value."
Santa Fe offered $150 per share despite an appraisal indicating
the value to be $125 per share.66 The shareholders were properly
notified. 17 Although they did not petition the court of chancery, they
did file suit in federal district court on behalf of the corporation and
other minority shareholders claiming: (1) the value of each share
was at least $772; (2) there was no prior notice of the merger; (3)
voting in both corporations. A decision of the parent corporation's board of directors
is sufficient to decide the action of both constituents. The procedure is euphemistically dubbed "short form merger." The logic of this rule with regard to the subsidiary is apparent; since the parent can cast 90 percent of the votes, no election is
necessary to determine whether a majority are in favor. With regard to the parent
corporation's voting, the logic is less evident, since the board of directors has no
formal power to make decisions for the shareholders. Probably the draftsmen considered that there is very little economic difference between owning 90 percent of a
subsidiary corporation's shares and owning the assets; the difference is an administrative detail which should be within the directors' competence.
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253(d) (1975) (amended 1976). Section 253(d), which has
since been amended, required that "[i]n the event all of the stock of a subsidiary. . . is not
owned by the parent . . . the surviving corporation shall, within 10 days after the effective
date of the merger, notify each stockholder...." Id.
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1982). This statute provides appraisal rights for the
minority shareholders "frozen out" as a result of a short form merger (or for dissenting shareholders in any merger). The shareholders must meet the statutory requirements of timeliness
and notice. The court of chancery then appraises the stock, determines a fair value, and directs
the corporation to pay that amount to the dissenting or frozen out shareholders. Id.; see Comment, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.: Ascertaining "FairValue" Under the DelawareAppraisal
Statute, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 426 (1981):

Appraisal statutes were introduced to accomodate the shifting role of minority
shareholders under state corporation law. At common law, a single shareholder
could veto mergers and other basic corporate reorganizations. Gradually, as the
complexities of commercial life demanded greater corporate flexibility, state legislatures withdrew this veto power. Instead, dissenting shareholders were given the
choice of either continuing as shareholders in the new corporate entity, or receiving
the value of their stock in the corporation. Recognizing that dissenters would not be
satisfied with a stock value determined by the majority, the states enacted appraisal
statutes, which enabled shareholders to receive a judicially determined value for
their stock.
Id. at 427 (footnotes omitted). For a general discussion of appraisal, see Note, Valuation of
Dissenters' Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1453 (1966).
66. 430 U.S. at 466.
67. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

9

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:159

the motivation for the merger was to freeze out minority shareholders at an inadequate price; and (4) Santa Fe violated rule 10b-56 8
through the use of a fraudulent appraisal to arrive at a price below
the shares' real value."9
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that with full and
fair disclosure the transaction went beyond the purview of rule lOb5.70 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure was a necessary element of a rule lOb-5 action. 7 1 The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals, finding no indication that Congress intended rule lOb-5
to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or deception. 2
The Court viewed manipulation as a "term of art," requiring
some deception or nondisclosure within the market which thereby
creates an artificial price for the shares. 73 The complaint by the
shareholders was reduced in the Court's opinion to a request for relief from an action that was merely unfair.7 4 This was seen as more
appropriately within the domain of a state court ruling on business
judgment principles, than as a basis for a rule lOb-5 federal action.7 5
The state law already recognized the minority shareholders' choice:
As long as all information was fairly presented, the shareholders
were assured of receiving the fair value of their shares through the
appraisal remedy.76 One commentator has noted: "The procedure
would be fraudulent in an economic sense only if the Delaware
courts refused to take seriously their duty of appraisal; and there is
7' 7
no evidence of this before the court in Green.
In other words, the state had already anticipated just such a
-situation occurring and had provided a remedy in the form of appraisal rights. The shareholders were in no way locked into the price
offered by the parent company; that they chose not to take advantage of the alternative (i.e. to petition the court of chancery) does
68.
69.
70.

430 U.S.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982).
430 U.S. at 467.
391 F. Supp. 849, 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd, 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd,

462 (1977).
533 F.2d 1283, 1287 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
430 U.S. at 471-73.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 478-80.
Id. at 466.
R. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 306 (2d ed. 1977).
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not alter the fact that it was available. It is obvious from the state
legislation that it was recognized and acceptable that a parent company, owning the requisite percentage of stock of a subsidiary, may
merge with that company regardless of the wishes of the minority
shareholders, as the legislation expressly providedfor such a circumstance."8 The only protection provided for the shareholders involved receipt of fair value for their shares. The Court did not find
this violative of federal legislation, since as long as there was full
79
disclosure, there was no violation of section 10(b) or rule lOb-5.
The shareholders were not prevented in this situation from exercising
any of their rights.
The scenario presented by the short form merger is clearly distinguishable from that of a tender offer. With full disclosure, the
shareholders in a short form merger are assured of the ability to
exercise their option (i.e., to receive full value for their shares). With
a tender offer, however, full disclosure on the part of the target corporation is no assurance of the ability of the shareholders to make a
free and informed choice. A defensive maneuver, even if disclosed,
may have the effect of preventing the shareholders from exercising
their option."0 A narrow reading of the term "manipulation" would,
therefore, totally frustrate the thrust of the federal legislation by not
providing for a cause of action based upon section 14(e)" l despite the
curtailment of the shareholder's options.
Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.
In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.,82 Mobil Oil Corporation
("Mobil") offered a premium to Marathon Oil Company ("Marathon") shareholders in return for a tender of their shares. Marathon's Board of Directors decided to fight Mobil's tender offer, and
sought a "white knight" in United States Steel. aa Marathon recommended United States Steel's proposed offer to its shareholders and
entered into a merger agreement with United States Steel.,4 Two
provisions of this agreement formed the crux of what Mobil claimed
were manipulative acts in violation of section 14(e). These provi78.

See supra notes 63 and 65.

79. 430 U.S. at 471-73.
80. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
81.
82.
83.

Williams Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 367.

84. Id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1983

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 5
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:159

sions--"lock up" options-granted United States Steel (1) an irrevocable option to purchase ten million unissued shares of Marathon,
and (2) an option to purchase Marathon's forty-eight per cent interest in the oil field known as Yates Field 5 if United States Steel's
offer was not successful and a third party gained control. 6
Mobil filed suit seeking to enjoin the exercise of the options,
alleging a violation of section 14(e) . Mobil was initially granted a
temporary restraining order prohibiting Marathon and United States
Steel from taking any action, but was subsequently denied a preliminary injunction on the ground that it had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, as all of the disclosures
were in accord with section 14(e)'s requirements. 8 The district court
judge rejected the argument that the two options included in the
merger agreement represented manipulative acts.8 9
The court of appeals reversed, holding that a substantial likelihood of success on the merits had been shown.9" The court went even
further and found the "lock-up" options to be manipulative,9 irrespective of their being disclosed. 92 The manipulation created an artificial price ceiling in the tender offer market by deterring any competitive bidding. The effect of the stock option was to prohibit
competition, as the cost to a competitive bidder trying to gain a majority interest escalated by a much greater factor (per each dollar
raise in the bid) than the cost to United States Steel. 93 The effect of
the option on Yates Field was to present any prospective competitor
with the specter of losing Marathon's best asset should it be successful in its offer. The possibility of a higher offer in the absence of the
options was evidenced by Mobil's counter-offer, which was $126 per
share to United States Steel's $125, but it was "conditional on the
judicial removal of the options." '
The court viewed manipulation as "an affecting of the market
85. Marathon had referred to Yates Field as its "crown jewel." Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 368.
88.

Id. at 368-70.

89.

Id. at 370.

90.

Id. at 369.

91.

Id. at 374-75.

92.

"In short, to find compliance with section 14(e) solely by the full disclosure of a

manipulative device as a fait accompli would be to read the 'manipulative acts and practices'
language completely out of the Williams Act." Id. at 377.

93. Id. at 375-76. For example, "every dollar raise in the bid by USS would cost USS
$30 million, while each such dollar raise would cost Mobil $47 million." Id. at 375.
94. Id. at 376.
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for, or price of, securities by artificialmeans, i.e., means unrelated
to the natural forces of supply and demand."95 The "lock-up" provisions were seen as artificially affecting, even completely blocking,
normal healthy market activity. The Second Circuit noted that the
provisions could well be construed as "expressly designed solely for
that purpose." 96 Unlike a merger situation, where the legislation not
only acknowledges but requires management decision making in the
acceptance or rejection process, a tender offer is the one situation in
which legislation expressly intended that the ultimate decision was
left to the shareholders-with no intermediary or approval stage by
management."
Subsequent Interpretationof Santa Fe and Mobil
Santa Fe Industries v. Green9" was interpreted by the Mobil
court as allowing for a finding of manipulation in acts that did not
include false or misleading statements, despite the fact that the two
often appear to be inextricably tied to one another.99 This view of
Santa Fe can be found elsewhere,100 but it is not the overwhelming
interpretation. Santa Fe is usually interpreted as standing for the
proposition that misrepresentation or deception is a necessary component of manipulation.101 Although section 10(b), not section 14(e),
is the statute involved in Santa Fe, the language of the two statutes
are of such similar nature that they are often construed in an identical manner.10 2 In fact, manipulation is not defined in either section, 103 and the application of the statutes can be quite different despite the similarity in language. 10 In Santa Fe, for example, the
shareholders had their statutorily protected options available to
them. 105 Nondisclosure was the only element in that situation that
95. Id. at 374 (emphasis in original).
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
98. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
99. 669 F.2d at 376.
100. E.g., H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1982 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 286 (1982). For a discussion of the definition of manipulation vis-a-vis rule lob-5, see 5b JACOBS, LITIGATION AND
PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 138 (1982).
101. E.g., Brown v. Ivie, 661 F.2d 62, 66 (5th Cir. 1981); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567
F.2d 209, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
102. E.g., Mobil, 669 F.2d at 373; Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 313-14
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
103. Mobil, 669 F.2d at 374.
104. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
105. 430 U.S. at 474 & n.14.
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would have interfered with the exercise of their rights.1" 6 In Mobil,
however, as in any tender offer situation, certain maneuvers by target management-whether disclosed or not-would necessarily interfere with the shareholders' ability to exercise their protected
rights. 107 This maneuvering, therefore, should constitute "manipulative acts"; otherwise, legislative intent will be defeated.108 The recognition of the essential nature of this interpretation can be seen in the
which the Mobil approach has received in subsequent
treatment
9
10

cases.

If Mobil was an anomoly, and if the subject matter were controlled by Santa Fe, courts should have no hesitation dismissing the
Mobil analysis. While no court has as yet duplicated Mobil's ruling,
a number of courts in other circuits have, directly or indirectly, addressed the Mobil approach.110 For example, the Mobil analysis was
followed in Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar."' This case involved a tender
offer by Whittaker Corporation ("Whittaker") for shares of Brunswick Corporation ("Brunswick"). Brunswick opposed the offer and
sought a "white knight." Brunswick entered into an agreement with
American Home Products Corporation ("American Home") for the
sale of an asset (Brunswick's subsidiary-Sherwood Medical Indus112
tries, Inc.) as a defensive maneuver to avoid Whittaker's takeover.
Both Whittaker and Brunswick moved for a preliminary injunction-Brunswick to enjoin the tender offer, and Whittaker to enjoin
the disposal of assets.113 Whittaker alleged that Brunswick, in giving
American Home a "lock-up" contract regarding a valuable asset, violated section 14(e).11 1
Although the court did not find a sufficient likelihood of success
on the merits to sustain a preliminary injunction for either side,115 its
analysis is important. While acknowledging that the Sixth Circuit's
106. See supra notes 41-55 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Standard Metals Corp., 541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Whittaker Corp.
v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982). But see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,
549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md. 1982); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 422
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).

110.
111.

See cases cited supra note 109.
535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982).

112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

941.
943-44.
944.
945.
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Mobil opinion is not binding precedent, the court went on, after a
lengthy explanation of the Mobil approach, to conclude that Whittaker had standing to allege a private cause of action for injunctive
relief under section 14(e) regarding Brunswick's disposition of its assets. 110 The court then distinguished Mobil by noting that the effect
of the sale of the asset in this case would not create an artificial
price ceiling nor pose a threat to other bidders.117 This entire aspect
of the case was discussed in the context of full disclosure, and the
manner in which the court approached the activities leaves little
doubt that had there been a "lock-up" type provision, manipulation
would have been found:
The fact that the Brunswick sale of Sherwood to American Home
permits the acquisition to be made by way of tender offer, shares
plus cash, or cash does not make the transaction fall within the
definition of a lock-up under Mobil. Brunswick has not granted any
lock-up option to American Home, nor did Whittaker revise its offer for Brunswick in an attempt to compete with the proposed sale
of Sherwood as Mobil did in the Mobil case. Thus, the sale of
Sherwood has not created an artificial price ceiling in the tender
offer market for Brunswick common shares which would be a manipulative act in violation of the Williams Act.11

When faced with a similar situation in Kennecott Corp. v.
Smith,11 9 the Third Circuit looked to the intent of the Williams Act
in deciding the scope of section 14(e).1 20 The issue in this case involved a conflict in the timing of disclosure as required by the state
takeover
disclosure law,1 21 with the timing required by the Williams
122
Act.
Kennecott Corporation ("Kennecott") made a cash tender offer
for shares of Curtiss-Wright Corporation ("Curtiss-Wright").1 23
Kennecott, which under state law was prohibited from commencing
116. Id. at 947-49.
117. Id. at 949.
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980).
120. Id. at 187-88.
121. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 49:5-3 (West Supp. 1983). Under this law, the corporation
initiating the tender offer is prohibited from commencing its offer until at least 20 days after
the announcement of its tender offer.
122. Under the Williams Act and rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. 240.14d-2(b) (1982), the
corporation initiating the tender offer is required to disclose certain information within five
days of commencement of the tender offer.
123. 637 F.2d at 182.
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its offer until at least twenty days after the announcement,124 was
of
threatened with further delay by the New Jersey State Bureau 125
Securities which decided to hold hearings on the proposed offer.
Curtiss-Wright resisted the tender offer and hearings were scheduled.1 26 Kennecott filed an action seeking an injunction of the state
law restraints since, it claimed, it would not be possible to comply
with both the federal and state regulations. The district court found
a lack of likelihood of success on the merits and a lack of likelihood
of irreparable injury.127 The court of appeals, in reversing, emphasized the potential damage arising from defensive tactics by a target
company.128 The court stated: "A primary purpose of the Williams
Act . . .is to ensure that . . . the shareholders of a target company
. . . may exercise a knowledgeable and an unfettered choice. The

Act is also designed to preserve a balance between incumbent management and challenging groups, so that neither has an undue advantage. 12 9 In discussing further the deleterious effects of allowing
defensive tactics, the court noted that "[w]hile being subject to [defensive tactics], . . . the shareholders cannot enjoy their federally
protected right . . . to make a choice about the governance of their

corporation and the disposition of their shares." 130
The court found that the element of time would enable the target company to erect barriers which would negatively affect the offeror and the shareholders.131 The analysis points to the timing involved in various disclosures (as opposed to nondisclosure) and to
are "designed to deprive the shareholders
defensive maneuvers '1that
2
choice."
free
of their
Another case implicitly acknowledging the Mobil approach is
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. StandardMetals Corp. 33 The plaintiff
in this case sought control of the defendant corporation through the
acquisition of stock and proxies. The plaintiff brought this suit alleging, inter alia, a violation of section 10(b) based on certain manipu124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See supra note 121.
637 F.2d at 182.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 188-89.
Id. at 187-88.
Id. at 189.
Id.
Id.
541 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
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lative activities.134 The plaintiff based its claim on the Mobil court's
analysis. 138 The defendants, on the other hand, argued that the allegations were subject to a Santa Fe analysis. 36 The court initially
applied the holding in Santa Fe to a separate count involving defendant-management's personal benefit in a tender offer.1 37 In another
count, involving alleged unfair transactions by management in order
to perpetuate themselves in control, Santa Fe and Mobil were both
raised.1 38 Instead of holding that Santa Fe was controlling over Mobil, the court distinguished Mobil on the facts,139 thereby implicitly
accepting the validity of Mobil's approach. The court found that
Mobil "does not provide authoritative support for plaintiff's theory"1 40 because in this case the plaintiff chose to solicit proxies instead of conducting a tender offer, and that there was no showing
that the plaintiff was being prevented from soliciting such proxies.1 41
The pains taken by the court to distinguish Mobil leads inexorably
to the conclusion that the court was willing to employ the Mobil
analysis should the facts of the case be similar enough to warrant its
application.
The Ninth Circuit demonstrated its acceptance of the Mobil
court's analysis in Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Investments, Inc.1 42
This case involved a tender offer by APC Investments ("APC") for
shares of Pacific Realty Trust ("PacTrust") and an attempt to block
the takeover by the trustees of PacTrust.1 43 The action by the trustees included: (1) enacting a bylaw prohibiting any shareholder from
owning more than 9.8% of PacTrust's stock; (2) suing in state court
to enjoin APC pursuant to the newly enacted bylaw; and (3) suing in
federal district court to enjoin APC's offer pending disclosure of information that would remedy alleged material misrepresentations
made by APC.1 44 The federal district court permanently enjoined
APC from proceeding with the offer, finding that the newly enacted
bylaw would block the lawful completion of the offer-a result that
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 1111-13.
Id. at 1113.
Id.
Id. at 1112-13.

138. Id.at 1113.
139. Id.

140. Id.
141. Id.

142. 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1982).
143. Id. at 1085.
144. Id.
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disclosure could not cure."1 5
Upon appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of the issue of full disclosure after determining that the PacTrust shareholders would be adequately protected by full disclosure since APC's proposed tender offer did not
create a "no-win predicament" for the shareholders.114 The circuit
court held that the shareholders would then be adequately protected
despite the presence of the bylaw. 147 In discussing PacTrust's argument that APC's tender offer was a violation of section 14(e)-in
light of the PacTrust bylaw which supposedly made completion of
the offer impossible-the court stated its acceptance of the Mobil
court's analysis:
There are instances when violations of [section 14(e)] are unrelated
to the information supplied to the shareholders. In Mobil Corp. v.
Marathon Oil Co.,. . . for example, . . . [t]he court held that by
creating an artificial price ceiling for competing tender offerors,
these "lock-up" options were manipulative acts which violated the
Williams Act and could not be cured by disclosure. . . . But the
alleged misconduct here, unlike in Mobil, did not artificially affect
market activity. 14 8

The most direct support for the Mobil court's analysis came
with the full adoption of its approach by a district court in the
Southern District of New York in Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v.
Datatab, Inc.149 Although both misrepresentation and manipulation
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1087.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1086.
149. 568 F. Supp. 1538 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). As this note went to press, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision. No. 83-7639 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 1983),
petitionfor cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512 (U.S. Dec. 21, 1983) (No. 83-1023). In its reversal,
the court of appeals expressly rejected the Mobil approach. The court, however, failed to analyze the Mobil approach and dismissed it merely by reference to dictum in a previous decision,
stating: "We disagree, therefore, with Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.. . . to the extent that
Marathon creates judge made substantive obligations imposed upon offerors or the management of offerees engaged in a tender offer contest and repeat our conviction [as stated in
Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d 757, 760 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 52 U.S.L.W.
3461 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1983) (No. 83-784)] that it is 'an unwarranted extension of the Williams
Act.'" Slip Op. at 9-10. The failure of the court to analyze the Mobil approach vis-a-vis the
facts in Data Probe is unfortunate. The case in which they did analyze and reject Mobil was
Buffalo Forge. The facts in that case, however, did not warrant the application of the Mobil
approach. The plaintiff in Buffalo Forge alleged manipulation by the target company despite
the fact that the options entered into increasedthe amounts offered for the target, and that the
plaintiff was the ultimate victor in the bidding war that ensued. 717 F.2d at 758-59. On the
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were involved, the court discussed at great length the availability of
section 14(e) to protect against manipulation even in situations in
which there was full disclosure. 150 The conflict in this case revolved
around the arranged merger between Datatab, Inc. ("Datatab") and
CRC Acquisition Corporation ("CRC"), a wholly owned subsidiary
of CRC Information Systems, whose board was dominated by former Datatab employees. 151 The merger negotiations also resulted in
lucrative employment agreements for certain Datatab employees in
management positions.152 Before the shareholder vote on the planned
merger, Data Probe, Inc. ("Data Probe") initiated a tender offer for
Datatab stock at a higher price per share than provided for by the
merger. 53 After determining that Data Probe would not provide the
same type of employment contracts as CRC, Datatab's management
attempted to block the tender offer by granting CRC an irrevocable
option to purchase authorized but unissued voting shares of Datatab
stock in an amount equal to 200% of the then outstanding voting
shares.'" This option provided CRC with the voting strength to approve the planned merger regardless of the wishes of any other
shareholders, effectively blocking any other offers and locking the
price to that of the CRC merger. This action by Datatab's management was the basis of Data Probe's claim of manipulation in violation of section 14(e).' 55
The court declared the option agreement void, 56 viewing the
question before it as "whether the Williams Act permits the management of a target company unilaterally to thwart an ongoing
tender offer by granting to one contestant an option that effectively
precludes further bids."' 57 The court analyzed Mobil, a number of
other cases, and the legislative history before adopting the Mobil
court's approach, and concluding:
[T]he [Williams] Act was written to assure stockholders access to
the information necessary to make informed judgments, which they
other hand, Data Probe presents the appropriate fact pattern for the application of the Mobil

approach and, therefore, warrants fuller consideration than the Second Circuit was willing to
provide in its decision.
150.

568 F. Supp. at 1543-45.

151.

Id. at 1541.

152.

Id.

153.

Id. at 1541-42.

154.

Id. at 1542.

155. Id. at 1543.
156.
157.

Id. at 1562.
Id. at 1543.
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would then in fact be allowed to exercise, however positive or detrimental the economic consequences. Congress therefore imposed in
the Act not one, but two duties on tender-offer participants, including target corporations: first, to provide shareholders the required
information; and second, to refrain from any conduct that unduly
impedes the shareholders' exercise of the decision-making prerogative guaranteed to them by Congress.158
This court went beyond the Mobil court in specifying conduct
that is permissible by target corporations, finding acceptable any tactic that has the purpose and effect of enhancing "the shareholders'
prospects, such as to attract rather than to repel competitive bidding. '159 While recognizing the need for the Securities and Exchange Commission to provide guidance by way of defining the
terms used in section 14(e), 16 0 the court called on other courts to
apply the Mobil court's analysis:16 1
[Flederal decisions both before and after the [Mobil] case make
clear that federal authority to enforce the [Williams] Act goes beyond its disclosure objectives. Federal jurisdiction and responsibility for enforcing the Williams Act matches precisely, as it should,
the legislation's dual objectives of assuring both an informed decision and a meaningful opportunity to decide. 162
CONCLUSION

The legislative history of the [Williams] Act is replete with indications that Congress intended to protect an investor faced with the
pressures generated by the exigencies of the tender offer context,
and that the sole purpose of § 14(e) is protection of the investor
faced with the decision to tender or retain his shares ....263
The Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Corp.'" court recognized
that the purpose and thrust of the Williams Act 6 5 is the protection
of the shareholder's options in a tender offer situation. 66 The court
also recognized that to require misrepresentation or deception as an
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
U.S. 1092
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1545.
Id. at 1559.
Id. at 1550-51.
Id.
Id. at 1548.
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
(1981) (emphasis added).
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981).
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) to (e), 78n(d) to (f) (1982).
669 F.2d at 376.
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element of manipulation is to read the term manipulation out of section 14(e)1 1 7 of the Williams Act, as the statute already prohibits
misrepresentation and deception. 68 Manipulation covers a wide
range of activities which, even when disclosed, can deprive a shareholder of his statutorily protected choice. 169 Any interpretation of
manipulation under section 14(e) which requires deception not only
contravenes congressional intent, but eviscerates the essence of the
statute.170 Such a construction is tantamount to saying: It is acceptable to deprive a shareholder of his statutorily protected options as
long as it is effected in the open with adequate disclosure.
The Mobil court was correct in allowing for a finding of manipulation in spite of full disclosure. It did not, however, extend its decision far enough, since it left no guidelines as to what acts fall within
the parameters of manipulation.171 There is no question that incumbent management has the right, if not the duty, to evaluate the effect
of the tender offer, and to advise the shareholders of the results of
the evaluation.17 2 In helping the shareholders to be as informed as
possible before exercising their options, management may advise the
shareholders as to what course to follow. Management may even solicit and propose alternatives to the shareholders. 73 Yet, in no way
should the incumbent management be allowed to take any action
that eliminates the shareholders' ability to make their choice and
exercise their options. A fair reading of section 14(e), in light of the
legislative intent,1 7 4 would define manipulation to include any act,
whether disclosed or not, which does not allow the shareholders to
exercise an informed choice. As one court has noted: "The legislation
167.

Williams Act § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).

168.

669 F.2d at 377; see supra note 3.

169.

See supra note 20.

170. See Edgar v. MITE Corp., 102 S.Ct. 2629, 2637 (1982); Rondeau v. Mosinee
Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975); Kennecott Corp. v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir.
1980); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 16, at 1749.

171. The Mobil court defines manipulation as the creation of an artificial and significant
effect on the market. 669 F.2d at 374. In Mobil, an artificial price ceiling was created. Id.
172. Management is in a better position than the average shareholder to evaluate the
effect of the impending tender offer. Management should, therefore, conduct an evaluation. It

must inform the shareholders of its position with respect to a tender offer within 10 days of the
announcement of the offer. Securities Exchange Commission rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e2 (1982).
173. See Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, supra note 16, at 113-15; Gilson, supra note 14, at
878-79.
174. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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as adopted concerned not only the provision of information, but the
175
guaranty of a fair opportunity to use it."1
Eric M. Mencher

175. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1547 (S.D.
N.Y.), revd, No. 83-7639 (2d Cir. Nov. 22, 1983), petitionfor cert. filed, 52 U.S.L.W. 3512
(U.S. Dec. 21, 1983) (No. 83-1023).
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